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Executive Summary 
Budget stabilization fund (BSF) is a general term for rainy day funds, contingency funds, and reserves. 
Historically, researchers have studies BSFs at the state level. However, after the Great Recession 
municipalities have increasingly adopted BSFs.  So far, there are several unknowns surrounding 
municipal BSFs. The intent of this paper is to start addressing some of these unknowns. The paper seeks 
to answer the question, did municipal BSFs smooth expenditures over the Great Recession? This study 
uses data from Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government and eleven comparable municipalities.  
The municipality BSF literature is in its infancy.  Previous research has focused on state BSFs. The 
optimal size for state BSFs is inconclusive, and the literature agrees that there should not be a one size 
fits all BSF fund size for states. The literature also agrees that states should consider revenue volatility 
when establishing a BSF policy. Municipal BSF research is limited and only examines cities within the 
same state. This study will add to the literature by looking at cities across state lines.  
Analysis for this capstone adopts a model that Justin Marlowe (2005) and Yilin Hou (2003) used to study 
if municipal BSFs smooth expenditures over the Great Recession. I created a unique trend line for each 
city using data from 1997 to 2001 to predict future spending. A positive expenditure gap is the result of 
a city spending more than predicted. A negative expenditure gap is created if the city spends less than 
predicted. Using a fixed effect model, I regressed the expenditure gap on four categories of explanatory 
variables: fund characteristics, financial measures, institutional factors, and demographic/ economic 
factors.  
Results show that cities divide themselves into two groups: always positive expenditure gap cities, or 
always negative expenditure gap cities. Positive expenditure gap cities had BSFs that were 14 percent of 
total revenues, and negative expenditure gap cities BSFs were 6 percent of total revenues, on average.  
Regression results indicate the size of a BSF is only statistically significant for negative expenditure gap 
cities, and as the BSF gets larger, the negative gap becomes more negative. The only variable that was 
statically significant for both positive and negative expenditure gap cities was income per capita. 
However, income per capital worked in opposite directions for the positive and negative expenditure 
gaps. 
The small sample size limited the scope of the study, and future research should have a large sample of 
cities across several states. With a larger sample size, it will be possible to look at expenditure gaps 
before, during, and after the recession. Additionally, this study created one expenditure trend line using 
data from 1997 to 2001, which was a period of high growth. It is possible expenditures during this time 
was not a good predictor for future expenditures and should be explored further.  
Over the course of this study, the number of cities with BSF policies increased from six to eleven. As 
more cities adopt BSF, the need for a better understanding of BSF and polices used to create and 
regulate becomes more pressing. There will not be a policy suitable for all cities, and when creating a 
policy, cities should consider the volatility associated with its top revenue sources, income per capita, 
and vulnerability to unemployment. While a withdrawal policy will be beneficial to limit excessive use of 
the fund, it should not be so restrictive that money cannot be accessed when needed. Along similar 
lines, establishing a minimum amount to be in a BSF will ensure there is money available during an 
economic downturn. However, the minimum needs to be flexible to allow the funds to be used during a 
recession. The minimum policy could include a plan to replenish the funds if they are drawn down. 
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Introduction 
Rainy day funds, contingency funds, slack, reserves, and budget stabilization funds (BSFs) are 
often used interchangeably to describe monies that state and local governments keep as savings. BSFs 
can be used to enhance credit ratings, save money in preparation for an unforeseen event such as a 
natural disaster, or allow the city to have funds available to smooth expenditures during tough 
economic times. 
During economic downturns, cities face an increased demand for services while revenues 
decrease. To compensate for the lower revenues, governments have a few options: raise taxes to 
increase revenues, reduce services offered, thus decreasing expenditures, issue debt, or utilize BSFs 
(Vasche & Williams, 1987). Politicians like to refrain from increasing taxes, since this may reduce their 
chance of being re-elected. Citizens come to expect a certain level of services, and if services are cut 
they will be dissatisfied. Issuing debt during economic downturns can be expensive. Ultimately, during 
trying economic times, these factors propel some local officials to attempt to smooth expenditures 
through the use of BSFs.  
In order for local governments to be able to smooth expenditures, it is important BSFs are an 
appropriate size. If a fund is too large, then tax payer money is sitting in savings and there is an 
opportunity cost to not spending the funds. On the other hand, if the fund is too small, municipalities 
will be unable to smooth expenditures and may have to increase taxes, reduce services, or issue debt.  
After the Great Recession, the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA), Governing, the 
Pew Research Center, and local governments have given BSFs a great deal of attention. In September 
2015, the GFOA published a best practice for “Appropriate Level of Unrestricted Fund Balance in the 
General Fund.” The best practice recommends that local governments maintain a minimum of two 
months, or 16 percent, of operating expenses as reserves (GFOA, 2015), but there is no evidence to 
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suggest that 16 percent is an appropriate or feasible level of reserves. Governing– a magazine providing 
news, insight, and analysis for state and local government leaders- has been publishing an increasing 
number of articles highlighting the importance and challenges of BSFs. In 2013, Governing published 
“What’s the Point of Rainy Day Funds?” (Marlowe, 2013).  The article highlights the idea that local and 
state governments do not know how large funds should be. Further underlining this concept, Governing 
published two more articles, one in 2014 (Farmer, 2014) and one in 2016 entitled “Having A Rainy Day 
Fund, But Not Knowing How to Spend It,” (Farmer, 2016). 
While there is an increased interest in local government BSFs, there is a void in the municipal 
finance literature examining BSFs. The goal of this paper is to start filling the void by asking the 
questions, did municipal BSFs effectively smooth expenditures during the 2007 to 2009 Great 
Recession?  If the BSFs were not large enough to smooth expenditures, how large would the funds have 
needed to be in order to smooth expenditures? This paper will also contribute to the literature because 
previous municipal work focused on cities within the same state, or even suburbs of one metropolitan 
area. I study Lexington, Kentucky and eleven benchmark cities across the country from 1997 to 2015, 
looking at actual expenditures compared to predicted expenditures. The data is collected from 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports, city ordinances, and census data. 
This paper is broken into four sections. Section one reviews the existing state and municipal 
literature with an emphasis on expenditure smoothing literature. Section two is the research design and 
results, section three contains the conclusion and policy implications, finally section four outlines 
limitations and areas for future study.  
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Literature Review  
Overview of state and municipal literature  
There is a vast collection of state-level BSF literature; however, the literature at the municipal 
level is in its infancy. Wolkoff published the first known work in 1987 and he argues rainy day funds and 
reserves are similar and municipalities might keep reserves as a type of rainy day fund. Tyer (1993) 
emphasizes the lack of literature and calls on scholars to conduct more research on municipal reserves. 
Using the assumption that the role of BSF is similar at the state and local level, state literature is used as 
a starting point for municipal research. The literature is broken into four broad categories: optimal level 
of reserves, impact on general obligation bond ratings, impact on general obligation bond ratings, and 
expenditure smoothing. 
Optimal Level of Reserves 
One field of study focuses on the optimal level of reserves, and scholars have used a variety of 
research methods to set an optimal reserve level. Vasche and Williams (1987) conduct a case study of 
California to measure volatility based on revenue shortfall. According to the authors, when states try to 
set an optimal size for their reserves, revenue forecasting errors are the most important factors to 
consider.  The authors are also concerned about creating a balance between having enough reserves to 
allow sustainability through a revenue shortfall and realizing the opportunity cost of keeping large 
reserves.   
Nelson and Cornia (2004) introduce a risk management technique known as value at risk1 to BSF 
literature. States can use this risk management technique to determine their optimal BSF size by looking 
at their specific revenue and expenditure risk. Another way to look at risk is to create a volatility index. 
Joyce (2001) uses state revenue volatility from 1997 to create a volatility score. The volatility index looks 
                                                            
1 Value at risk is a simulation technique looking at the worst possible scenario  
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at the volatility in revenue from corporate income tax, economic environment, reliance on federal aid, 
gambling revenue, and Medicaid expenditures. Then, Joyce compares the volatility score with the actual 
size of fund to conclude that each state needs to determine their own unique optimal reserve size.  
Joyce also concludes most states do not have large enough reserves to be prepared for an economic 
downturn because of their high volatility scores (Joyce, 2001). 
Research varies in trying to determine the optimal size of BSFs. In a study of Ohio, Navin and 
Navin (1997) determine reserves of thirteen percent of own source revenues2 are appropriate for a 
large revenue shortfall. Thirteen percent stems from fluctuation in personal income and revenue 
forecasting errors (Navin & Navin, 1997). In a case study of Georgia, Sjoquist (1998) uses personal 
income as a revenue collection proxy and finds that reserves of twenty-seven percent own source 
revenue will be sufficient for a large revenue downturn. Finally, Lav and Berube (1999) determine 
eighteen percent of current expenditure is the optimal level. These authors’ conclusions provide a wide 
variety of recommendations ranging from thirteen percent to twenty-seven percent of own-source 
revenues, leaving states to continue to guess at the best optimal reserve size. 
Kriz (2002) examines whether the optimal size of municipal reserves is the same for state and 
local governments, and what factors are taken into account for fund levels. He uses a Monte Carlo 
simulation and, like Joyce (2001), determines the five percent goal for states is too simplistic. Rather, 
fund sizes are dependent on the revenue history and mix, and by his calculations, should be around 
thirty percent (Kriz, 2002). It is unknown where the original five percent goal comes from, though Navin 
and Navin (1997) explain that that National Conference of State Legislatures quote “Wall Street analysis” 
for recommending a five percent target. 
                                                            
2 Own source revenues are revenues generated by charges for services or the collection of local taxes. For 
example, property tax, local income tax or local option sales tax for example 
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Similar to the literature focused on optimal reserve levels, Gianakis and Snow (2007) highlight 
the risk associated with relying on intergovernmental revenues. Intergovernmental revenues are 
revenues from either the federal or state government. Gianakis and Snow focus on local governments in 
Massachusetts to see if BSFs are the first funds to be used in the event of an economic downturn. The 
authors do not find evidence to support the hypothesis that governments use BSFs first and suggest this 
could be because funds are hard to access; governments must secure a two-thirds vote from the 
legislature to use the funds. Additionally, they conclude the size of the fund is largely attributable to an 
increase in demand for services from a high population growth rate and an increase in the birth rate. As 
the demand for services increase, so does the size of the BSF (Gianakis & Snow, 2007).  
Table 1 below summarizes literature addressing optimal reserve levels. Revenue volatility- 
caused by revenue source and forecasting errors - is the main determinate of the optimal reserve size. It 
is vital that my study accounts for different types of revenue sources.  
Impact on GO Bonds 
According to theory, default risk is lower if states have more reserves.  Therefore, credit ratings 
should be higher with larger reserves. There is little empirical support for this proposition; Grizzle (2010) 
finds the size of fund has a minimal impact on credit ratings. Similar to Knight & Levinson (1999) and 
Wagner (2003), Grizzle (2010) determines it is the characteristics of the funds that have the largest 
impact on bond ratings. For example, weaker withdrawal rules lead to higher credit ratings and weak 
deposit rules are associated with lower credit ratings (Grizzle, 2010).  
In 2011 Marlowe took a different approach and tried to determine the optimal size of local 
reserves by looking at crediting ratings. Similar to state literature (Grizzle, 2010), he concludes slack 
resources matter, but it is impossible to determine the optimal size based on credit ratings. Credit 
ratings are largely influenced by factors out of the government’s control (Marlowe, 2011). Because past 
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research has found little empirical evidence linking bond ratings to the size of BSFs, this research will not 
include bond ratings.  
Table 1. Optimal Level of Reserves 
Authors Research Method Findings Implications for Research 
Vasche and 
Williams 
(1987) 
State of California case 
study examining revenue 
volatility.  
Reserves should be formed 
based on the size of revenue 
forecasting error. For 
California, that is around 5% 
Revenue volatility 
determines forecasting 
errors  
Nelson and 
Cornia (2004) 
Value at Risk for state 
budgeting  
Utah has a 5% chance of 
having a deficit of $135 
million or greater  
Value at Risk is another 
method to consider 
revenue. 
Joyce (2001) Volatility Index based on 
1997 state revenues. 
There is no one size fits all 
BSF size for states. Most 
states do not have a large 
enough reserve to be 
prepared for an economic 
down turn. 
Revenue source and the 
volatility of the revenue 
source matters for setting 
a BSF policy.  
Navin and 
Navin (1997) 
State revenue short fall 
relative to changes in 
personal income. 
The state of Ohio would 
require a BSF of 13% of own 
source revenue to protect 
against a large revenue short 
fall. 
Personal income is a key 
variable when determining 
the size of BSF. 
Sjoguist  
(1998) 
State revenue short fall 
relative to changes in 
personal income. 
The state of Georgia would 
require a BSF of 27% of own 
source revenues. 
Personal income is a key 
variable when determining 
the size of BSF. 
Lav and 
Berube (1999) 
Examines state revenue 
fluctuations. 
States should maintain a BSF 
of 18% of current 
expenditures. 
Revenue volatility drives 
the demand for BSF. 
Kriz (2002) Monte Carlo simulation Historical revenue mix and 
volatility drive the need for 
BSF. States should have BSFs 
of 30% of total revenue. 
There is less need for BSF 
when there is a less 
volatile source of revenue.  
 
Impact on Savings 
Another body of literature assesses whether BSFs increase a state’s savings. Wager (2003) 
argues that monies in stabilization funds are substitutable with general fund reserves. He researched if 
the creation of BSFs increases savings or just moves savings from the general fund to the BSF. 
Ultimately, he determines BSFs do increase savings, but only marginally. Wagner (2003) emphasizes 
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characteristics of the fund and establishes a widely used scale for deposit and withdrawal rules. Knight 
and Levinson’s (1999) research finds a stronger relationship between the presence of rainy day funds 
and increased savings. They find states that have rainy day funds have more savings with BSFs than they 
did without the funds. The funds’ rules are an important factor in the amount of savings an entity keeps 
on hand; funds with rules requiring more savings do save more, and funds with strict withdrawal rules 
save more than funds without strict withdrawal rules  (Knight &Levinson, 1999). 
Hendrick (2006) uses the Chicago suburbs to examine the role of slack (spare resources) in local 
governments. She makes a distinction that is not in other BSF literature: economic theory versus 
organizational theory. In what she describes as economic theory, BSFs are a poor political strategy 
because they focus on the long term, whereas politicians are focused on the short term. From an 
organizational theory perspective, however, reserves are a good management practice because they 
provide a buffer for tough economic times. Hendrick (2006) runs three different regressions with three 
different dependent variables: unreserved fund balance, current fiscal condition measured by operating 
surplus or deficit, and change in own source revenue. She concludes slack resources are interchangeable 
during economic downturns and local governments might not realize the risk involved with relying on 
intergovernmental revenue (Hendrick, 2006). 
Wagner (2003) and Hendrick (2006) proposed BSF money is interchangeable with money in the 
general fund. This finding is important because some cities have fiscal policies designating BSFs while 
others simply use the unassigned fund balance as its BSFs. Based on these author’s results, I will 
compare money designated for budget stabilization purposes with general fund money. Table 2 
summarizes the literature examining the on the impact of BSFs on savings. 
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Table 2. Impact on Savings 
Authors Research Method Findings Implications for Research 
Wagner (2003) State level time series 
scale for withdrawal and 
deposit policies.  
The presence of BSF 
minimally increases 
savings.  
Characteristics of the BSF 
are important. BSF money 
is interchangeable with 
general fund money. 
Knight and 
Levinson (1999) 
Time series analysis of 
states’ savings. 
The presence of BSF 
increases state savings. 
The control variables are 
broken into three 
categories: fund 
characteristics, economic 
and demographic, and 
institutional factors. 
Hendrick (2006) Three models studying 
the accumulation of 
reserves in the suburbs 
of Chicago. 
From an organizational 
theory perspective, 
reserves provide a buffer 
for tough economic times. 
Slack resources are 
interchangeable 
 
Expenditure Smoothing  
Another component of the literature examines whether the presence of BSFs smooths 
expenditures. To do that, it must first be determined whether BSFs fluctuate in a counter-cyclical 
manner; in other words, to determine whether BSFs grow in strong years and are spent during economic 
downturns to smooth expenditures. Sobel and Holcombe (1996) take this approach and analyze state 
BSFs during the 1990-1991 recession. They established a fiscal policy of neutrality to study expenditure 
smoothing. A fiscal policy of neutrality means expenditures grow at the same rate over time and tax 
rates are kept the same. The authors use the fiscal policy of neutrality as their benchmark and then they 
calculate the actual expenditure short fall, or the difference between fiscal neutrality. Next, they add the 
expenditure short fall to any increase in taxes to create a measure of fiscal stress. Controlling for 
characteristics of the rainy day fund, they find the presence of a savings requirement leads to lower 
fiscal stress. Sobel and Holcombe then determine how large the rainy day fund would have needed to be 
prior to the recession to maintain fiscal neutrality during the recession. The fund size depended on how 
hard the state was hit by the recession, but overall states did not have large enough funds to maintain 
the same level of expenditures (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996).  
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In 2003, Hou uses data from state’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports to determine if 
BSFs are able to smooth expenditures and, if so, by how much. First, Hou has to determine if the 
expenditure gaps are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. Using a Prais-Winsten regression3, Hou regresses 
the expenditure gap on a three-year lag of gross state product. If it is determined the gap is pro-cyclical 
it is possible for reserves to be used to smooth expenditures. The expenditure gap is then regressed on 
BSF characteristics, socioeconomic factors, balanced budget requirements, and political factors. Hou 
examines the results by separating the data selection to compare coefficients during economic upturn 
years to economic downturn years. Hou's research concludes BSFs are an effective counter cyclical 
measure, narrowing the negative gap but unassigned reserves are not effective counter cyclical reserves 
(Hou, 2003).  
Marlowe (2005) takes a similar approach with local government reserves. He creates an 
expenditure linear trend line and uses a Prais-Winston regression model to determine pro-cyclicality of 
expenditures. However, rather than lagging gross state product like Hou (2003), Marlowe (2005) uses a 
one, three, and five year lag of the change in current revenue. After Marlowe determines expenditures 
are in fact pro-cyclical, he regresses the expenditure gap on a variety of control factors: revenue 
considerations, institutional factors, and budgeting practices. Evaluating the upturn years against the 
downturn years, Marlowe (2005) concludes slack resources do smooth expenditures, with smaller 
municipalities observing more robust smoothing. Table 3 summarizes the expenditure smoothing 
literature. 
The methods and results from previous work provide guiding lessons for this paper. The optimal 
size literature finds that revenue volatility is a key factor when determining the size of a BSF. If revenue 
is more volatile, then BSFs need to be larger in order to be prepared for an economic downturn. The 
                                                            
3 A Prais-Winston regression controls for auto-correlation in time series data.  
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impact on savings literature determines that funds committed to BSFs and unassigned funds are 
interchangeable. This finding is critical because it will allow me to count all unassigned funds as a part of 
a BSF. Finally, Hou (2003) and Marlowe’s (2005) methods are used this paper. The research design 
section outlines the expenditure gap method in more detail.  
Table 3. Expenditure Smoothing 
Authors Research Method Findings Implications for 
Research 
Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996) 
Calculate a measure of fiscal 
stress based on the difference 
between the fiscal policy of 
neutrality and actual 
expenditure plus tax 
increases. 
If the state has a policy 
requiring savings deposits, 
there was lower fiscal stress.  
Overall, BSF were not large 
enough to have a fiscal state of 
neutrality. 
Should control 
for policy 
characteristics.  
Hou (2003) State expenditure gap based 
on expected expenditures and 
actual expenditures. 
Designated BSFs narrow the 
expenditure gap during 
economic downturns but 
unassigned funds are not an 
effective reserve mechanism.  
This paper will 
use the 
expenditure gap 
model.  
Marlowe (2005) Municipality expenditure gap 
based on expected 
expenditures and actual 
expenditures. 
Slack resources do reduce the 
expenditure gap, and the 
results are more robust in small 
municipalities. 
This paper will 
use the 
expenditure gap 
model. 
 
Research Design 
This study seeks to answer two questions: Did municipal BSFs effectively smooth expenditures 
during the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009? If the BSFs were not large enough to smooth expenditures, 
how large would the funds have needed to be to smooth expenditures?  
Data Collection 
This study focuses on Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky and eleven comparable cities. The 
selected cities are cities Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government typically uses for benchmarking.  
They are similar in population and also home to a major university. The presence of a university is 
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essential for comparison because the schools are often economic drivers for the cities and provide a 
more stable revenue base. Appendix A lists the comparable cities.  
The time period of interest is 2002 through 2015, but expenditure data is collected back to 1997 
in order to create an expenditure trend line. Data is collected from Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Reports (CAFRs), municipal ordinances, financial policies, and the census. If data from ordinances or 
policies needed clarification, emails were made to the finance commissioners.  
The expenditure gap is the dependent variable, and explanatory variables can be put into four 
categories: fund characteristics, financial measures, institutional factors, and demographic/ economic 
factors. 
Method- Did Municipal BSFs Smooth Expenditures during the Great Recession? 
The method is largely based off of Marlowe (2005) and Hue (2003). To determine if the BSFs were 
large enough to smooth expenditures during the great recession I created a unique linear expenditure 
trend line for each city using expenditure data from 1997 to 2001. 
(I) E*it= αi + βiT1 
Where E*it is equal to the expected total expenditures in municipality i at time t, αi is the constant 
for municipality i, βi is the slope of the predicted expenditures for municipality i, and T1 is the value of 
the year in year 1.  
The expenditure gap is the dependent variable and is expressed as a percentage, and is calculated in 
equation II. E is actual expenditures and E* is expected expenditures based on the trend line. There is a 
positive expenditure gap if actual expenditures are greater than expected expenditures and a negative 
expenditure gap if actual expenditures are less than the predicted expenditures.  
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(II) Expenditure Gap = 𝐸𝐸−𝐸𝐸
∗
𝐸𝐸∗
 
Using panel data, I used a fixed effect model to regress the expenditure gap on the explanatory 
variables. The variables can be broken into four categories: fund characteristics, financial measures, 
institutional factors, and demographic/ economic factors. After the model was run, tests were done to 
ensure there was not heteroskedasticity  
(III) Egap*ij=αi+β0FundChacteristics+β1FinancialMeasures+β2InstitutionalFactors+β3Demo_EcoFactors+ᵋit 
Explanatory Variables  
The four categories of explanatory variables are: fund characteristics, financial measures, 
institutional factors, and demographic and economic characteristics. I chose the explanatory variables 
based on findings in past literature.  
Fund Characteristics 
From 2002 to 2009, the size of a city’s BSF is measured as the unreserved fund balance as a 
percentage of general fund revenues. From 2010 to 2015, the BSF is measured as the sum of unassigned 
fund balance, committed funds when committed to BSF purposes, and assigned fund balance, as a 
percentage of general fund revenues. The BSF has to be measured two different ways because the 
Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) implemented standard 54 in 2009. The unreserved 
fund balance, used from 2002 to 2009, is money that is legally available for any purpose. In 2009, the 
GASB passed standard 54, replacing parts of standard 34, removing the classification of unreserved and 
developing the unassigned fund balance. The unassigned fund balance is the amount that is spendable 
and not assigned to specific uses (GFOA, 2009). Under both methods, the funds for the BSF are funds 
that are legally eligible for any use.  
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Some cities have a designated fund within the unassigned fund balance which use is specified 
for use during economic downturns. Governments earmark the money for use during economic 
downturns, but is still legally eligible to be used for any use so is classified as unassigned. A dummy 
variable indicates the presence of such fund. If a designed fund is present, it is typically associated with a 
withdrawal and deposit policy.  
Past research has found that a withdrawal policy is significant in the functioning of a BSF 
(Wagner, 2003., Grizzle, 2010., Knight & Levinson, 1999). For the purpose of this paper, a withdrawal 
policy can be a legal ordinance or just a part of the city’s fiscal policies that outlines how money that is 
set assigned for rainy day can be accessed. If the policy is too restrictive, governments cannot access the 
monies during an economic downturn.  If the policy is overly relaxed, governments will use the 
frequently and the BSF will not be large enough to have an impact on expenditure gaps. A dummy 
variable is used to indicate if the government has a withdrawal policy of any kind. Additionally, a dummy 
indicates the presence of a deposit policy and another dummy indicates the presence of a minimum 
reserve level to control for cities have a minimum level. The minimum reserve level is not predicted to 
limit the negative expenditure gap completely, because not all of the funds will be used to smooth the 
gap.  
Table 4 outlines the fund characteristics variables, where the data comes from, and the 
hypothesized relationship with the expenditure gap.  
Financial Measures 
The financial measures are intergovernmental revenue, property tax revenue, and revenue from 
an income based tax. These measures are picked based on the reviewed literature indicating that 
revenue instability, based on the type of revenue, is important when determining the size of a BSF.  
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Intergovernmental revenues, funds from the state or federal government, are volatile because 
state governments cut funding to local governments during economic downturns. I will calculate 
Intergovernmental revenues as a percent of total revenues, and it is expected to increase the positive 
and negative expenditure gap. Property tax revenue is measured as a percentage of total revenue and is 
expected to limit the expenditure gap. Policy makers have the ability to increase property taxes or 
increase the assessed value of property to ensure a set amount of revenue is collected.   
Income tax revenue is also measured as a percentage of total revenue, and is expected to widen 
the expenditure gap. The gap is expected to widen because income tax revenue is exposed to business 
cycle volatility. In an expansion, more people are employed and have higher paying jobs, thus producing 
more revenue. The opposite is true during a recession.  
Table 5 outlines the fund characteristics variables, where the data comes from, and the 
hypothesized relationship with the expenditure gap.  
 Table 4. Fund Characteristics 
Variable Data 
Source 
Theory Source 
Budget Stabilization 
Fund (% of total 
revenue) 
CAFR The set of cash used to balance expenditures rather 
than increasing taxes or issuing debt. The larger the 
fund, the smaller the expenditure gap. 
Hou (2003)  
Marlowe 
(2005) 
Presence of 
Designated 
Contingency Fund 
(Dummy) 
Ordinance 
or finance 
policy 
Having specific funds saved for economic downturns 
should allow for smoothing of expenditures allowing 
for a smaller negative gap. The gap will be smaller if 
there is a designated fund because cities have 
prepared to use the funds. 
Hou (2003) 
Marlowe 
(2005) 
Withdrawal Policy 
(Dummy) 
Ordinance 
or finance 
policy 
A dummy indicates the presence of a withdrawal 
policy. If there is a withdrawal policy, the gap is 
expected to be smaller because it is harder for the 
city to access the funds.  
Wagner 
(2003) 
Deposit Policy 
(Dummy) 
Ordinance 
or finance 
policy 
A dummy variable indicates the presence of a 
deposit policy. The presence of a deposit policy is 
expected to bring the gap closer to zero because 
there would be money in the fund to access in 
downturns.  
Wagner 
(2003) 
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Table 5. Financial Measures 
Variable Data Source Theory and Hypothesis Source 
Intergovernmental 
Revenue (% of total 
revenue) 
CAFR Intergovernmental funds are risky because they are 
dependent on the state or federal government. As 
the percentage of revenue from intergovernmental 
sources increase, the negative gap is expected to 
increase. . 
Marlowe 
(2005) 
  
Property Tax 
Revenue (% of total 
revenue) 
CAFR As property tax as a percentage of total revenue 
increases, the expenditure gap is expected to be 
closer to zero. 
Marlowe 
(2005) 
Income Tax Type 
Revenue (% of total 
revenue) 
CAFR As income type tax revenue as a percentage of 
total revenue increases, the expenditure gap is 
expected to widen.  
 
 
 
Institutional Factors 
Institutional factors include the type of government and whether the municipality owns an 
electric or water utility. Marlowe (2005) cited authors for finding evidence that council-manager 
governments plan and save more for the long term whereas mayor-council governments spend more. 
He found evidence that council-manager governments had smaller negative gaps during downturn years 
and this paper is expected to replicate that result.    
A dummy variable indicates the presence of a municipal owned electric utility and another 
dummy variable indicates if the municipality owns a water utility company. Municipalities owning their 
own electric utility and water utility are expected to impact the expenditure gap because during tough 
economic times, the city still has to pay to keep the two utilities operational. There is not expected to be 
an impact on the upturn years’ gap, but the presence of either is expected to increase the negative gap 
because the services have to be provided, but the downturn will harm revenue collection. Table 6 
displays the institutional factor variables, where the data will come from, and the hypothesized 
relationship with the expenditure gap.  
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Table 6. Institutional Factors 
Variable Data 
Source 
Theory and Hypothesis Source 
Municipality Owned 
Electric Utility (Dummy) 
CAFR Governments that own electric companies have 
smaller general funds and funds can be moved 
between utility funds and the general fund and 
act as another reserve fund. The expenditure gap 
will be limited. 
Marlowe 
(2005)  
Tyer (1993) 
Municipality Owned 
Water Utility (Dummy) 
CAFR Governments that own water companies have 
smaller general funds and funds can move 
between utility funds and the general fund and 
act as another reserve fund. Decreases the 
expenditure gap. 
Marlowe 
(2005)  
Tyer (1993) 
Council-Manager or 
Mayor Council 
(Dummy) 
CAFR Council-manager governments plan and save 
more for the long term whereas mayor-council 
governments spend more. There will be a smaller 
expenditure gap. 
Marlowe 
(2005) 
 
Demographic and Economic Factors 
The final group of explanatory factors is demographic and economic factors. These factors 
reflect the demand for services. An increase in population growth rate and unemployment rate are 
expected to increase the positive and negative expenditure gap because all of these factors represent an 
increase in demand for government services. Finally, a higher personal income per capita will decrease 
the demand for social services, and results in a decrease positive and negative expenditure gaps.  Table 
7 outlines the variables, where the data will come from, and the hypothesized relationship with the 
expenditure gap.  
Table 7. Economic and Demographic Characteristics 
Variable Data Source Theory  Source 
Population 
Growth 
CAFR Demand for services. A higher growth rate will increase 
the demand for services, increasing the expenditure gap.  
Hou 
(2003) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
CAFR The higher the unemployment rate, the larger demand 
for social services and the larger the expenditure gap. 
Hou 
(2003) 
Personal Income 
Per Capita 
CAFR As personal income increase the demand for services will 
decrease shrinking the expenditure gap. 
Hou 
(2003) 
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Summary Statistics 
 Cities divided themselves into two groups: positive expenditure gap cities and negative 
expenditure gap cities. All of the cities expect for Nashville remained either a positive gap city or a 
negative gap city from 2002 to 2015. The mean expenditure gap for cities with a negative gap was -0.33, 
meaning these cities spent, on average 33 percent less than the trend line. The mean expenditure gap 
for cities with a positive expenditure gap was 0.26, meaning they spent 26 percent more than the trend 
line. Negative cities had, on average, a smaller BSF with the mean BSF being six percent of revenues and 
the positive gap cities had a mean BSF of 14 percent of total revenues. Positive gap cities relied far more 
on intergovernmental revenues and property tax revenues.    
Cities with Positive Expenditure Gaps: 
• Chapel Hill, North Carolina  
• Knoxville, Tennessee  
• Lincoln, Nebraska 
• Madison, Wisconsin  
• Nashville, Tennessee  
Cities with Negative Expenditure Gaps: 
• Ann Arbor, Michigan  
• Chattanooga, Tennessee 
• Cincinnati, Ohio 
• Columbus, Ohio 
• Lexington, Kentucky 
Note: Data for Indianapolis and Louisville was collected, but the city and county governments merged in 
the middle of the data set. 
Table 8. Summary Statistics 
 
Positive Expenditure Gap Negative Expenditure Gap 
  Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
Expenditure Gap 0.26 0.12 0.02 0.53 -0.33 0.17 -0.64 0 
BSF 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.1 
Population Growth 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.07 0 0.02 -0.06 0.09 
Unemployment Rate 0.05 0.02 0 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.09 
Income Per Capita($) 52,739  23,513  32,351  107,726   55,671  35,736  3,891  128,867  
Intergovernmental  0.21 0.14 0.05 0.52 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.21 
Property Tax  0.42 0.16 0.08 0.66 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.6 
Income Type Tax  0.02 0.04 0 0.15 0.16 0.18 0 0.4 
Designated Fund  0 0 0 0 0.46 0.5 0 1 
Source: Data compiled by author, Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
19 
 
 As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a lot more attention to municipal BSFs in 
recent years and the increased attention could be driven by an increased use of BSF. In 2002, only six of 
the cities in the study had any sort of policy guiding use and maintenance of the BSFs. By 2015, five 
additional cities adopted policies to guide the use of funds, bringing the total to 11 of the 12 cities. The 
only city without any BSF policy is Nashville, and Nashville was the only city to move between a positive 
expenditure gap and a negative expenditure gap. Appendix A shows what year each city adopted a 
minimum BSF balance. 
Findings 
 A fixed effect regression was used to control for characteristics of cities that could not be 
controlled for with specific variables. Regression results are broken into two categories: positive 
expenditure gap (spending more than the trend) and negative expenditure gap (spending less than the 
trend). The only variable that is significant for both positive and negative gap cities is income per capita. 
For a positive gap city, if the average income per capita increases by $1,000, expenditures are 0.014 
percentage points higher than expected. Meaning, for Knoxville, if income per capita increases from 
$39,500 to $40,500 a year, total expenditures would increase by $3 million a year. For the negative gap, 
if the income per capita increases by $1,000, the gap becomes more negative by 0.0028 percentage 
points.  For example, if Columbus’ per capita increases from $43,500 to $44,500, expenditures would 
decrease by $4 million. 
 The other statistically significant variables for positive gap cities are property tax revenue as a 
percentage of total revenue and the presence of a withdrawal policy. Looking at property tax revenue, if 
property tax revenue as a percentage of total revenues increases by one percentage point, the 
expenditure gap decreases by 0.513 percent, meaning expenditures are closer to predicted 
expenditures. This result might be explained by the fact that governments have greater ability to adjust 
property tax rates or property values in order to generate a set amount of money. The presence of a 
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withdrawal policy means that a city with a withdrawal policy has a smaller expenditure gap (closer to 
zero) than if there was no policy. The smaller expenditure gap with the presence of a withdrawal policy 
might mean the withdrawal policy restricts the city from spending more money than it would have 
otherwise. The rho value for the positive expenditure gap cities is 0.9622, meaning the city fixed effect 
caused 96 percent of the variance. The R-squared for the remaining four percent is 0.37, so the model is 
not a good fit for positive expenditure gaps.  
 Moving to negative expenditure gap cities; the statistically significant variables other than 
income per capita are BSF, unemployment rate, and a policy requiring a minimum BSF. If the BSF 
increases by one percentage point, the gap gets more negative by 2.289 percentage points. For 
example, if Columbus were to increase its BSF by one percent of total revenues, its expenditures would 
decrease by 2.289 percent, or $37 million. Uncertainty among policy makers on how and when BSFs 
should be used could cause the gap to become more negative as the BSF gets larger. The unemployment 
rate is also significant. As the unemployment rate increased by one percent, the expenditure gap 
becomes more negative by 1.536 percent. Finally, a presence of a minimum balance makes the gap even 
more negative (spending less) by 0.0107 percent, compared to cities without a minimum policy. One 
possible explanation is if there is a minimum requirement, and the BSF is close to the minimum when a 
recession hits, the city cannot access the funds. According to the rho value, characteristics of the cities 
explain 95 percent of the variance. The R-squared value of 0.818 indicates the model better fits cities 
with a negative expenditure gap. Table 10 displays the regression outputs.  
The literature supports the results presented below. The literature on optimal reserves stresses 
the importance of personal income per capita, and income per capita is the only variable that is 
significant in the positive and negative gap models. Literature studying the impact on savings and 
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smoothing expenditure shows that BSF policy characteristics are important and in this model, the 
withdrawal policy and minimum reserve policy matter. 
Table 10. Regression Outputs 
  Positive Expenditure Gap  Negative Expenditure Gap 
VARIABLES Coefficient  Standard Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
BSF -0.418 -0.263 -2.289*** -0.448 
Population Growth -0.987 -0.789 -0.181 -0.396 
Unemployment Rate 1.467 -0.917 -1.536*** -0.482 
Income Per Capita $1000 0.0143*** -0.0037 -0.0028** -0.0010 
Intergovernmental Revenue 0.321 -0.238 0.638* -0.376 
Property Tax Revenue -0.513* -0.274 0.56 -0.449 
Income Type Tax Revenue -0.138 -0.708 -0.954 -0.626 
Designated Fund  -   -   
Withdrawal Policy -0.141** -0.055 -0.047 -0.043 
Deposit Policy -   -   
Minimum Policy -   -0.107*** -0.033 
Mayor Council -   -   
Own Water -   -   
Own Electric -   -   
Constant -0.329 -0.211 0.0748 -0.138 
Observations 59   50   
Number of Cities  5   5   
Variance Explained by Cities 0.9622   0.9592   
Prob > F 0.0039   0   
R-squared 0.37   0.818   
Significance: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
   Source: Data compiled by author, Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
Cities in the study are split evenly between positive and negative gap cities, and do not move 
between categories during the recession, showing the BSFs did not smooth expenditures during the 
recession. Marlowe’s (2005) research supports the lack of expenditure smoothing in these large cities. 
His results showed BSF had an effect on small cities and not much of an impact on large cities. 
Additionally, Hou (2003) determined that BSF that were made of unassigned fund balances did not 
smooth expenditures. All of the cities, expect Lexington, BSF’s are within the unassigned fund balance 
and the BSFs did not smooth expenditures.  
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Method- How Large would the BSFs have needed to be to Smooth Expenditures? 
The second purpose of this paper is to determine how large BSFs would have needed to be in 
order to smooth expenditures during the Great Recession if there was a negative expenditure gap. After 
reviewing the summary statistics and the regression results, it is not possible to determine how large 
BSFs should be. The cities were equally split between positive and negative gaps, and did not change 
overtime. The size of the BSF was only significant when there was a negative expenditure gap, and the 
larger the fund, the larger the expenditure gap.   
Conclusion and Recommendations  
 While BSFs did not effectively smooth expenditures during the Great Recession, they are 
becoming more popular as evidenced by five cities creating policy over the course of the study. The 
following recommendations are based on or inferred from findings. It is important that policy makers 
understand how to create and regulate a BSF that will allow the city to continue to provide services 
during economic downturns. However, characteristics of the city determine if cities were able to smooth 
expenditures or not, and thus each city will need to create a policy specific to its needs.  
Recommendation 1: There should not be a uniform BSF for all cities, rather every city should 
create a BSF policy specific to its needs and should consider its main revenue sources when 
creating the policy. 
 Current BSF policy appears to limit cities’ ability to smooth expenditures, making the creation 
and alteration of policies extremely important. The intended use of the fund should drive the make-up 
of the policy. 
Recommendation 2: Cities may consider multiple reserve funds with different policies based on 
their intended use. For example, there could be a reserve fund for natural disasters that is 
separate from a reserve fund for revenue downfall. 
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 Having separate funds will allow for policies to be more specific and not hinder cities’ ability to 
access funds with needed.  Once governments establish separate reserves, reserves specific to revenue 
downfall should have a flexible minimum reserve policy. 
Recommendation 3: Minimum reserve policies should be designed to enable the fund to utilized 
during the recession. The policy should include a plan to re-build the fund once the recession has 
passed.  
If a negative expenditure gap city has a minimum reserve policy the expenditures become more 
negative. Therefore, a flexible minimum reserve policy will encourage a city to save during economic 
upturns, while at the same time, allowing the city to access the funds when they are needed during an 
economic downturn.  
Limitations and Areas for Future Study   
There are data limitations to this study. Data was collected over nineteen years, and over that 
time, reporting standards changed several times, precautions were made to ensure that all data was 
collected based on full accrual accounting. Also, data before 2002 was difficult to gather because it was 
not online and resulted in some missing data. Some observations were lost because Indianapolis and 
Louisville changed types of governments. Indianapolis and Louisville both form some type of merged 
government with their respective counties, making it impossible to create a viable expenditure trend 
using data from 1997 to 2001.  
All cities that were studied were large cities with universities. Having all similar cities helps for 
comparison within the study, but results cannot be extrapolated to other types of cities. University cities 
generally are less affected by recessions because University’s provide a lot of jobs and enrollment in 
universities is counter-cycle. There is a need for research that examines serval types of cities in one 
study.  With more cities, it will be possible to run regressions that can be separated by recession and 
non-recession years.  
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The expenditure gaps in this study were based on a trend line created from1997 to 2001, and 
this period was a period of high growth. The gaps created based on this trend line could be purely driven 
by the expenditures from 1997 to 2002 and not accurately reflect the true effect of BSFs. More studies 
should be done with different years as the base year. This study also did not control for the 2001 
recession.  
This study only looked at expenditures as a whole. Future research should look at specific 
expenditure categories to see where cities cut spending during the recession. If spending is cut from 
infrastructure or economic development, how does that affect the state of the city after a recession? 
Municipal BSFs require a lot more research, and as an increasing number of cities adopt BSF policies 
there will be more data available for future research.  
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Appendix A. List of Comparable Cities 
Source: Compiled by Author 
“Always” means for the duration of the study 
 
  
City University Year Minimum Balance Policy 
was Adopted (%) 
Lexington, Kentucky University of Kentucky Always (10%) 
Ann Arbor, Michigan University of Michigan  2010 (12%) 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina University of North Carolina Always (12%) 
Chattanooga, Tennessee  University of Chattanooga 2006 (15%) 
Cincinnati, Ohio University of Cincinnati 2015 (17%) 
Columbus, Ohio The Ohio State University Always (15%) 
Indianapolis, Indiana  Butler University  2011 (10%) 
Knoxville, Tennessee University of Tennessee 2011 (20%) 
Lincoln, Nebraska  University of Nebraska Always (20%) 
Louisville, Kentucky  University of Louisville Always (8%) 
Madison, Wisconsin  University of Wisconsin Always (15%) 
Nashville, Tennessee  Vanderbilt University Never 
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